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INSURANCE COMPANIES
AS CORPORATE REGULATORS:
THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY
Shauhin A. Talesh*
INTRODUCTION
Political scientists, economists, and legal scholars have been debat-
ing corporate social responsibility for decades.1  To that end, the fi-
nancial crisis, fraud relating to Enron and Worldcom, Occupy Wall
Street, and even the 2016 presidential primary debates all raise atten-
tion and concern about what corporate social responsibility is and
should be in the United States.  The traditional view, the standard
shareholder-oriented model, suggests “corporations have no specific
social responsibilities beyond profit maximizing for the benefit of
shareholders” as long as such profit maximizing occurs without violat-
ing the law or engaging in deception or collusion.2  More recently, a
progressive alternative, the stakeholder-oriented model, suggests cor-
porate officers’ and managers’ underlying social obligations go be-
yond merely maximizing shareholders’ wealth within the confines of
following the law.3  Rather, under this model, corporate social respon-
sibility means that directors should consider the impact of their deci-
* Professor of Law, Director, Law & Graduate Studies Program, University of California,
Irvine School of Law.  I would like to thank Cathy Sharkey and Max Helveston for helpful
comments on earlier drafts.  I would also like to thank Itohan Okogbo and Elad Shem-Tov for
outstanding research assistance on this project.  An earlier version of this paper was presented in
the spring of 2016 at the 22nd Annual Clifford Symposium of Tort Law and Social Policy at
DePaul University College of Law.
1. Henry N. Butler & Fred S. McChesney, Why They Give at the Office: Shareholder Welfare
and Corporate Philanthropy in the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 84 CORNELL L. REV.
1195, 1195 (1999) (noting the longstanding debate over corporate social responsibility).
2. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO.
L.J. 439, 440–41 (2001) (explaining the shareholder based model); Cynthia A. Williams, Corpo-
rate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 708
(2002).
3. See Steven M.H. Wallman, The Proper Interpretation of Corporate Constituency Statutes
and Formulation of Director Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 163, 168–70 (1991) (noting a more
progressive approach toward corporate social responsibility). See generally PROGRESSIVE COR-
PORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995); Frank Partnoy, Adding Derivatives to the Corpo-
rate Law Mix, 34 GA. L. REV. 599 (2000).
463
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sions on a wider range of constituents, including employees,
consumers, suppliers, the community, and the environment.4
To whom the corporation is responsible is juxtaposed against the
reality that corporations are subject to more laws and regulations than
ever before.  Modern corporations are subject to an expansive set of
laws through the legal acts of incorporation, bankruptcy, mergers, ac-
quisitions, patent, copyright, antitrust, health and safety, labor, em-
ployment, and environmental laws.  Laws attempt to guide, impact,
and constrain corporations as they operate.
Despite a wide variety of laws pressing on corporations, it is less
clear how legal regulations influence corporate social responsibility.
Laws regulating the behavior of organizations are often ambiguous
and vague with respect to how to comply.5  Moreover, many of the
laws regulating organizations are complex and require elevated levels
of expertise.  It is not entirely clear how legal regulation shapes not
only the internal governance of a corporation, but also assures corpo-
rations comply with labor and employment, environmental, privacy,
and financial regulation and securities laws.  Thus, despite the pleth-
ora of laws impacting corporations, there remains an ongoing debate
concerning the best way to regulate corporations, especially given that
approaches anchored in private contract law are insufficient.
Prior research focuses on the role regulatory intermediaries play in
assisting organizations to comply with various laws.6  These ap-
proaches suggest that despite the vast array of laws imposed on corpo-
rate entities, legal and non-legal actors within or affiliated with
organizations play a significant role in shaping the way organizations
go about complying with laws.  These regulatory intermediaries con-
sist of corporate actors such as directors and officers as well as corpo-
4. See Wallman, supra note 3, at 168–70; see also David Millon, Communitarianism in Corpo- R
rate Law, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, supra note 3, at 11–12; Partnoy, supra note 3, at R
609–10.
5. See Shauhin Talesh, A New Institutional Theory of Insurance, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 617,
621–22 (2015).  “[T]here is nearly always some degree of legal ambiguity in laws regulating orga-
nizations.” Id. (citing Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity in Symbolic Structures: Organiza-
tional, Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1531–38 (1992)).  “This ambiguity in legal
regulation leaves a space for the social construction of the meaning of law . . . .” Id. (citing
Lauren B. Edelman, Overlapping Fields and Constructed Legalities: The Endogeneity of Law, in
PRIVATE EQUITY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE DYNAMICS OF CAPITAL MARKET REGU-
LATION 55, 58–65 (Justin O’Brien ed., 2007)).
6. For a summary of the ways that intermediaries impact and influence the way organizations
respond to law, see Shauhin Talesh, Legal Intermediaries: How Insurance Companies Construct
the Meaning of Compliance with Antidiscrimination Laws, 37 L. & POL’Y 209, 212–14 (2015);
Shauhin A. Talesh, Rule-Intermediaries in Action: How State and Business Stakeholders Influence
the Meaning of Consumer Rights in Regulatory Governance Arrangements, 37 L. & POL’Y 1,
24–25 (2015).
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rate-affiliated actors like in-house counsel, managers, and human
resource officials.  Intermediaries try to advise, interpret, and imple-
ment laws in ways that attempt to achieve compliance.  Legal in-
termediaries play a major role in shaping the content and meaning of
laws designed to regulate corporations, how corporations understand
law and compliance, and how corporations go about responding to
laws.
This Article explores an intermediary of corporate behavior that
has been less explored by corporation and organizational behavior
scholars: insurance companies.  In recent years, insurers are increas-
ingly acting as corporate regulators.  Prior research in insurance law
suggests that insurance acts as a substitute for regulation and high-
lights the ways insurance institutions act as risk regulators and regu-
late so many aspects of an individual’s and organization’s relationships
in society.7  Scholars suggest that insurance can serve as a substitute
for regulation and monitor organizational behavior in ways the gov-
ernment does not.  These scholars are largely optimistic about insur-
ance as a substitute for regulation8 and the role of insurance
companies as risk managers of corporate responses to regulation.9
However, there has been less empirical inquiry into the precise role of
insurance companies as regulators of corporations.  In particular, how
and under what conditions do insurance companies regulate corporate
behavior and influence corporate social responsibility?  Corporations
are subject to more laws and are interconnected with more constitu-
ents and shareholders than ever before.  This Article addresses how
insurance companies regulate corporate behavior.  In order to explore
how corporations impact the wide variety of constituents and stake-
holders that go beyond shareholders, I examine corporate behavior
from a stakeholder perspective.
Drawing from empirical research of insurance companies that ad-
vise corporations on how to comply with privacy, securities, and em-
ployment laws, this Article argues that the value of insurance and
insurance institutions as substitutes for regulation is not as uniformly
7. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces
Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 217–28 (2012) (arguing insurance acts a form of risk
regulation and performs regulatory functions better than government in many instances).  For a
comprehensive explanation of the concept of insurance as regulation, see infra notes 29–46 and
accompanying text.
8. See Ben-Shahar & Logue, Outsourcing Regulation, supra note 7, at 199–200 (arguing insur- R
ance regulates safety better than the government and can reduce and solve moral hazard and
other incentive problems).
9. Id. at 228, 235–38 (highlighting why insurers are potentially better regulators than
government).
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positive as previously suggested.  In particular, insurance companies
are not simply pooling and transferring risk.  Rather, insurers are us-
ing their risk management tools and services to influence how corpo-
rations comply with laws.  This Article argues that insurance company
interventions range from positive (good) to negative (bad) to down-
right ugly (i.e., insurer interventions have unappealing impacts on the
way organizations understand their legal obligations).  With my focus
on qualitative case studies of insurer risk management techniques in
action, I highlight the specific ways insurers facilitate and inhibit com-
pliance with law and corporate social responsibility in different
situations.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II briefly articulates the vari-
ous strands of corporate social responsibility, noting that little atten-
tion is paid to focusing on the role of insurance companies as
corporate regulators.10  I then examine insurance law scholarship,
which focuses on how insurance acts as a substitute for regulation.
Part II concludes by noting that these scholars have largely celebrated
the role of insurers as risk managers without close exploration of the
processes and mechanisms through which insurers act as risk
regulators.
Part III uses three case studies to explore how insurance companies
act as regulators of corporate behavior with respect to privacy, securi-
ties, and employment law.11  I argue that empirical research in this
area suggests that insurers as corporate regulators is a mixed bag:
sometimes good, sometimes bad, and sometimes unappealing.
In response to the rise in data breach events and the accompanying
privacy laws, insurers are now offering organizations cyber insurance.
My empirical research reveals that insurers absorb many of the re-
sponsibilities of an organization’s legal, compliance, public relations,
and information technology departments by offering risk management
services to prevent and detect data breaches before they occur.  Given
that organizations are admittedly under-prepared for data breach
events and under-compliant with privacy laws, I conclude that insur-
ance company risk management interventions have been largely
helpful.12
After highlighting the relatively positive risk management ap-
proaches used by insurers, I then highlight the negatives of insurer
risk management.  Unlike in the cyber insurance context, insurance
companies offering directors’ and officers’ insurance have opportuni-
10. See infra notes 16–46 and accompanying text. R
11. See infra notes 47–153 and accompanying text. R
12. See infra notes 47–96 and accompanying text.
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ties to engage in loss prevention and discourage wrongful or even ille-
gal behavior, but fail to do so.  Insurance companies acting as
corporate regulators in this instance do little more than ensure corpo-
rate misconduct and undermine shareholder litigation.13
My final case study explores how insurers in the past twenty years
have begun offering employment practice liability insurance.  This is
insurance for employers sued for sexual harassment, wrongful termi-
nation, and other employment violations.  Unlike the directors’ and
officers’ insurers that had opportunities to engage in loss prevention
but failed to do so, I find that employment practice liability insurers’
do offer risk management and loss prevention advice but do so in a
way that weakens the meaning of antidiscrimination law.  Thus, insur-
ance company regulatory intervention in the employment law context
may help employers avoid being sued, but may have some perverse
and unappealing effects as well.14
This Article, therefore, contributes to studies of corporate social re-
sponsibility and insurance.  First, I shine light on a different profes-
sional intermediary that is less explored by those interested in the way
professional intermediaries impact corporate social responsibility.
Second, this Article contributes to insurance-as-regulation literature
by using prevailing empirical research on insurers as risk managers to
show under what conditions insurance risk management facilities or
inhibits corporate compliance with laws.  Recent scholarship suggests
insurance substitutes as regulation in positive ways, but my empirical
lens presents a more complex picture.  I show that insurance-as-regu-
lation goes beyond deterrence and loss prevention and reducing moral
hazard.  Insurance institutions transform the meaning of compliance
and the deterrence signal.
I conclude by suggesting that the insurance-as-regulation narrative
previously articulated by scholars requires more nuance and empirical
exploration.15  The debate going forward is not whether insurers are
good risk regulators as prior scholars theorize, but more precisely, ex-
amining under what conditions can insurers make positive regulatory
interventions into corporate behavior and nudge corporations toward
a governance structure in line with societal values of fairness, equality,
transparency, and safety.  From a public policy standpoint and consis-
tent with the stakeholder model of corporate social responsibility, I
conclude that we should not defer to insurer intermediary practices
13. See infra notes 97–122 and accompanying text. R
14. See infra notes 123–53 and accompanying text. R
15. See infra notes 154–55 and accompanying text. R
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without seeing tangible evidence that such responses are in fact work-
ing well and leading to greater compliance by corporations.
II. THE ROLE OF PRIVATE INSURANCE COMPANIES AS
SUBSTITUTES FOR PUBLIC REGULATION
Corporate social responsibility suggests that business and society
are interwoven.  What corporate social responsibility means and who
the corporation is ultimately beholden to has been debated for de-
cades.  I will not try to summarize the vast literature in this Article
but, instead, point out the two dominant ways that scholars concep-
tualize corporate responsibility.  The standard shareholder-oriented
model suggests corporate managers are charged with managing the
corporation exclusively in the shareholders’ economic and profit-max-
imizing interests.16  This approach suggests the interests of other cor-
porate stakeholders, such as creditors, suppliers, employees and
customers, are protected17 by other laws, such as antitrust, consumer
protection, labor, employment, privacy, and environmental law.18
Other constituents find protection in explicit contracts with the
corporation.
The progressive alternative is derived from the stakeholder theory
of the corporation.  This model suggests that corporate managers’ so-
cial obligations include considering the impact of their decisions on a
wider range of constituents than shareholders, including employees,
consumers, suppliers, and the environment.19  Corporations have re-
sponsibilities to the larger community because of their role as eco-
nomic institutions and their impact on society.20  Public laws and
regulations and private contract law try to protect the interests of em-
ployees, consumers, and the environment more broadly.21
16. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 440–41 (2001); see also MILTON FRIEDMAN,
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962); Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business
Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32–33.
17. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 442.
18. See Williams, supra note 2, at 713 (“While Hansmann and Kraakman recognize corporate R
responsibilities to constituents other than shareholders, where those responsibilities are embod-
ied in positive law (such as in antitrust, consumer protection, labor, or environmental laws) or in
explicit contracts, and they recognize the importance of corporations serving the interests of
society as a whole, they reject the view that corporate law itself ought to embody a multi-fiduci-
ary or stakeholder model of accountability.” (footnotes omitted)).
19. Wallman, supra note 3, at 170. R
20. See Ronen Shamir, Capitalism, Governance, and Authority: The Case of Corporate Social
Responsibility, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 531, 532–53 (2010).
21. See Williams, supra note 2, at 720 (noting that formal legal rules have not protected most R
constituencies).
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Under either framework, laws that impact organizations are sup-
posed to press down on organizations and force them to comply with
legal regulations.  Thus, in theory, law is supposed to play a big role in
protecting shareholders and other stakeholder rights when dealing
with organizations.  In fact, there are plenty of laws regulating various
aspects of organizations.  In particular, employment and anti-discrimi-
nation law attempt to protect the rights of employees to work in a
discrimination free workplace.  Privacy laws require organizations to
notify consumers in the event of a data breach.  Consumer protection
laws seek to protect consumers in transactions with businesses.  Secur-
ities laws seek to protect shareholders from scrupulous corporate
practices.  Environmental laws require organizations to conduct their
business in ways that do not pollute or harm the environment.  Of
course, these laws are just a few of the many laws impacting organiza-
tions.  Given the multitude of laws regulating organizations and the
lack of clarity in many laws with respect to how to comply with them, I
have previously explored how corporations often shape and influence
the content and meaning of the legislation and regulatory rules that
are designed to regulate them.22  Moreover, in trying to interpret and
implement various laws that organizations are subject to, organiza-
tions frequently look to managers, in-house counsel, and other profes-
sionals to help achieve compliance with these laws.23
Prior research that explores how organizations respond to law
shows that business, management, and legal professionals are key car-
riers of ideas among and across organizations.  In particular, human
resource officials, personnel managers, management consultants, and
in-house lawyers communicate ideas about law as they move among
organizations, participate in conferences, workshops, training sessions,
professional networking meetings, and publish professional personnel
22. For further conceptualization of how private organizations shape the content and meaning
of laws that are designed to regulate them, see generally LAUREN EDELMAN, WORKING LAW:
COURTS, CORPORATIONS & SYMBOLIC CIVIL RIGHTS (2016); Lauren B. Edelman & Shauhin A.
Talesh, To Comply or Not to Comply—That Isn’t the Question: How Organizations Construct the
Meaning of Compliance, in EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS RESPONSES TO REGULATION
103 (Christine Parker & Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen eds., 2011); Shauhin A. Talesh, How Dispute
Resolution System Design Matters: An Organizational Analysis of Dispute Resolution Structures
and Consumer Lemon Laws, 46 L. & SOC’Y REV. 463 (2012); Shauhin A. Talesh, Institutional
and Political Sources of Legislative Change: Explaining How Private Organizations Influence the
Form and Content of Consumer Protection Legislation, 39 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 973 (2014);
Shauhin A. Talesh, The Privatization of Public Legal Rights: How Manufacturers Construct the
Meaning of Consumer Law, 43 L. & SOC’Y REV. 527 (2009).
23. Given that different scholarly communities use the terms corporations and organizations, I
will use the term interchangeably.
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literature.24  Existing empirical research reveals that when organiza-
tions attempt to comply with laws, managerial conceptions of law
broaden the term “diversity” in a way that disassociates it from its
original goal of protecting civil rights,25 transform sexual harassment
claims into personality conflicts,26 deflect or discourage complaints
rather than offering informal resolution,27 and even shape the way ar-
bitrators understand law and compliance.28  Thus, we know corpora-
tions are subject to complying with a vast array of laws, have multiple
constituencies beyond their shareholders, and increasingly look to
professional intermediaries on how to comply with laws.
More recently, insurance scholars are discussing the role of insur-
ance as a form of regulation over individuals and organizations.29  In-
surance regulates many aspects of our lives.  Insurance companies
establish the underwriting criteria and standards and charge premiums
based on various risk-profiles.  These mechanisms allow insurance
companies to control who can or cannot obtain insurance.30  Through
insurance policy terms and pricing provisions, insurance companies
24. For a series of studies highlighting how the professions mediate and managerialize law, see
generally SANFORD M. JACOBY, EMPLOYING BUREAUCRACY: MANAGERS, UNIONS, AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF WORK IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY, 1900–1945 (1985); James N. Baron et al.,
War and Peace: The Evolution of Modern Personnel Administration in U.S. Industry, 92 AM. J.
SOC. 350 (1986); Lauren B. Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric and the Managerialization of Law,
106 AM. J. SOC. 1589, 1594–99 (2001); Lauren B. Edelman et al., Internal Dispute Resolution:
The Transformation of Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27 L. & SOC’Y REV. 497, 505–06, 514–15
(1993); Talesh, Legal Intermediaries, supra note 6, at 210, 226–34. R
25. See Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric, supra note 24, at 1590 (examining how managerial R
rhetoric about diversity influences employers’ employment policies and procedures and how
professional personnel literature broadens how the term “diversity” is used in relation to dis-
crimination claims).
26. See Edelman et al., Internal Dispute Resolution, supra note 24, at 516–17 (showing how R
grievance and anti-harassment officers transform legal disputes into interpersonal disputes and
focus on healing the relationship).
27. See Anna-Maria Marshall, Idle Rights: Employees’ Rights Consciousness and the Construc-
tion of Sexual Harassment Policies, 39 L. & SOC’Y REV. 83, 85–86 (2005) (showing how sexual
harassment policies are constructed through a managerial lens).
28. See Talesh, Dispute Resolution, supra note 22, at 469 (“[L]aw becomes ‘managerialized’ R
when business values such as rationality, efficiency, and management discretion operating within
an organizational field influence the way organizations understand law, legality, and
compliance.”).
29. For a comprehensive explanation of the concept of insurance as regulation, see generally
Shauhin A. Talesh, Insurance and the Law, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL &
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 215 (James D. Wright ed., 2d ed. 2015); Tom Baker, Insurance in Soci-
olegal Research, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 433 (2001) [hereinafter Sociolegal Research]; Tom
Baker, Liability Insurance as Tort Regulation: Six Ways that Liability Insurance Shapes Tort Law
in Action, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 10–12 (2005); Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, How Insur-
ance Substitutes for Regulation, REGULATION, Spring 2013, at 36 [hereinafter Substitutes for Reg-
ulation]; Ben-Shahar & Logue, Outsourcing Regulation, supra note 7. R
30. See Ben-Shahar & Logue, Substitutes for Regulation, supra note 29, at 37–41. R
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also establish norms of conduct.  Private insurance policies for life,
health, and property often take the form of private legislation or regu-
lation through a wide variety of exclusions and conditions.  In addition
to serving a gatekeeping function, liability insurance acts as a form of
tort regulation and, in doing so, finances the civil litigation system.31
Although many commentators note that insurance companies often
act as regulators of risk,32 Professors Omri Ben-Shahar and Kyle
Logue argue that insurance companies have advantages as regulators
over the government due to information and motivation asymmetries.
In drawing a distinction between government regulators and insurers,
these scholars note that government regulators are not paid for per-
formance, lack adequate incentives, are not disciplined by market
forces, and lack advanced tools for information acquisition, aggrega-
tion, and prediction.33  Through actuarial techniques, private con-
tracting, and ex post claim investigation, Ben-Shahar and Logue argue
insurers do not only engage in risk regulation, but insurers can also
reduce insureds’ moral hazard behavior and induce efficient risk-re-
ducing behavior in ways that government regulators fail or have lim-
ited success.34  In particular, they argue that insurance develops
templates to regulate behavior in ways that are potentially more pre-
cise than some forms of governmental control.35  Moreover, even
when government is needed to regulate when insurance markets fail,
insurers provide the necessary information and motivation to nudge
31. See Baker, Liability Insurance, supra note 29, at 13 (2005) (“[L]iability insurance is a de R
facto element of tort law” and a de facto cap on tort damages). See generally KENNETH S. ABRA-
HAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT LAW FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/
11 (2008) (exploring how both first-party and third-party liability insurance influenced the devel-
opment of tort liability); Stephen C. Yeazell, Re-Financing Civil Litigation, 51 DEPAUL L. REV.
183 (2001) (highlighting how insurance and credit finance the civil litigation system).
32. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUB-
LIC POLICY 57 (1986) (noting “surrogate regulation” when describing the new regulatory role
being imposed on liability insurers to regulate toxic tort and environmental risks); DAVID A.
MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS THE ULTIMATE RISK MANAGER 10 (2002);
Tom Baker, Bonded Import Safety Warranties, in IMPORT SAFETY: REGULATORY GOVERNANCE
IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 215, 216–22 (Cary Coglianese et al. eds., 2009) (advocating for reli-
ance on insurers to police food safety); Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, First-Party Insurance
Externality: An Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 188
(1990) (calling for moving the regulatory function of product safety to products-liability insurers
through adoption of strict products liability); Joshua Ronen, Post-Enron Reform: Financial-State-
ment Insurance and GAAP Revisited, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 39, 48–60 (2002) (arguing for
using insurance to regulate the accuracy of financial statements).
33. Ben-Shahar & Logue, Outsourcing Regulation, supra note 7, at 198–99 (noting the R
problems with government regulators and arguing that insurers can outperform government
regulators).
34. Id. at 199–229 (highlighting how insurers act as risk regulators).
35. Id.
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government regulators to act.36  Thus, under this approach, insurers’
loss prevention tools can enhance tort law’s deterrent effects.37  Insur-
ers have the power to regulate in a variety of ways, including “man-
dating specific investments in risk reduction, offering premium
discounts for favorable claims experience, to selling cost-containment
expertise to policyholders and even designing safety technologies and
codes.”38  In addition, insurers use private contracting as a mechanism
for monitoring organizational behavior and compliance.
Focusing on policy language, actuarial, and underwriting practices,
these scholars argue that insurance covering product liability, workers’
compensation, automobiles, homeowners, environmental liability, and
tax liability, regulate individuals and businesses in ways that are more
constructive than government regulation.39  In particular, because in-
surers have superior access to information and commercial sophistica-
tion, they deploy a series of strategies to improve the safety conduct of
their policyholders.  Ben-Shahar and Logue conclude that because of
insurers’ inherent informational advantage, these institutions are bet-
ter regulators than regulatory, legislative, or judicial institutions.40
Other scholars have explored the relationship between loss preven-
tion and policyholder moral hazard across a variety of domains includ-
ing legal malpractice,41 medical malpractice,42 motion pictures,43
36. Id.
37. See ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY, supra note 31, at 228 (recognizing that “a ver- R
sion of tort law’s deterrence function has slowly been incorporated into insurance”); Catherine
M. Sharkey, Revisiting the Noninsurable Costs of Accidents, 64 MD. L. REV. 409, 413 (2005)
(“Insurance companies, as private regulators, are well positioned to achieve deterrence through
experience rating of firms and other actors, as well as by providing risk management services.”);
Steven Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 BELL J. ECON. 120, 120–21 (1982) (arguing that
when certain assumptions are taken into account, liability insurance is socially desirable).
38. Ben-Shahar & Logue, Outsourcing Regulation, supra note 7, at 247. R
39. Id. at 217–28 (highlighting how insurance as risk regulator works better than the
government).
40. Id. at 201 (“We contend that private insurance markets can and sometimes do outperform
the government in regulating conduct because of both superior information and competition.”).
41. See generally George M. Cohen, Legal Malpractice Insurance and Loss Prevention: A
Comparative Analysis of Economic Institutions, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 305 (1997); Anthony E. Davis,
Professional Liability Insurers as Regulators of Law Practice, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 209 (1996).
42. See generally Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, The Effect of Malpractice Liability
on the Delivery of Health Care, F. HEALTH ECON. & POL’Y, Jan. 2005, at 1; Tom Baker, Medical
Malpractice and the Insurance Underwriting Cycle, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 393 (2005); Bernard
Black et al., Stability, Not Crisis: Medical Malpractice Claim Outcomes in Texas, 1988-2002, 2 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 207 (2005).
43. See generally Elizabeth O. Hubbart, When Worlds Collide: The Intersection of Insurance
and Motion Pictures, 3 CONN. INS. L.J. 267 (1997).
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firearms,44 personal injury,45 and most recently policing.46  Thus,
across a variety of areas, insurers regulate corporations.  Because cor-
porations impact a wide variety of constituents such as shareholders,
employees, and suppliers, as the shareholder theory of corporate so-
cial responsibility suggests and are subject to a wide variety of laws,
insurance and insurance companies in particular, play a major role in
trying to assure corporate social responsibility, within the shareholder
and stakeholder models of corporate social responsibility.
As insightful as this work and that of others who discuss insurance
as a form of regulation is, studies in this area focus primarily on insur-
ance policy provisions, actuarial techniques, and claims practices as
generating a form of regulatory oversight.  Rarely is there a strong
focus on the role that insurance companies play.  Finally, and most
importantly, there is little empirical research designed to uncover the
processes and mechanisms through which insurers engage in risk regu-
lation. How do insurers as risk regulators work in action?  Does it
always work? Under what conditions does insurance as a form of reg-
ulation work?  Despite the well-settled belief in the field that insurers
act as risk regulators and that insurers are a welcome substitute to
government, there is little fine-grained analysis of how insurance com-
panies go about acting as regulators.  To the extent that insurers are
regulatory intermediaries, there is less data on how this occurs and
what the benefits and burdens of such an approach are.
The following attempts to address this void by examining how insur-
ers go about regulating organizations.  In particular, this Article uses
three case studies to explore this question: under what conditions do
insurance companies act as risk regulators?  It also explores the im-
pact of insurer interventions through risk management programs that
they offer organizations.  In particular, this Article focuses on how in-
surers do not just engage in risk regulation, but often shape and influ-
ence the meaning of compliance among corporations in good, bad,
and sometimes unappealing ways.  Given that corporations who care
about corporate social responsibility often look to insurers as poten-
tial intermediaries, the following case studies provide a closer analysis
of the ways in which insurers facilitate or hinder corporate social re-
44. See generally Tom Baker & Thomas O. Farrish, Liability Insurance & the Regulation of
Firearms, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL
AND MASS TORTS 292 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2005).
45. See generally STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW: NEW
COMPENSATION MECHANISMS FOR VICTIMS, CONSUMERS, AND BUSINESS (1989).
46. See generally John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 HARV. L.
REV. 1539 (2017) (arguing insurance risk management encourages better policing practices).
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sponsibility and compliance with the vast array of laws that corpora-
tions are subject to complying with.
III. EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES ON INSURANCE COMPANIES
AS CORPORATE REGULATORS
A. Insurance Risk Management in the Privacy and
Data Breach Context: The Good
Cybersecurity risks (i.e., “loss exposure associated with the use of
electronic equipment, computers, information technology, and virtual
reality”) are among the biggest new threats facing businesses and
most consumers.47  Data breach events cause financial and public rela-
tions damage and threaten an organization’s survival.48  Organizations
also face compliance challenges as they are forced to navigate be-
tween the various federal and state laws and regulations concerning
the collection and use of personal data.  Despite these threats, prevail-
ing empirical research suggests private organizations are not signifi-
cantly changing their behavior.  Although many organizations do have
formal policies in place, the majority of organizations do not believe
that they are sufficiently prepared for a data breach, do not devote
adequate money, training, and resources toward protecting con-
sumer’s electronic information from data breaches, and fail to per-
form proper risk assessments.49  In fact, many organizations find
47. Gregory D. Podolak, Insurance for Cyber Risks: A Comprehensive Analysis of the Evolv-
ing Exposure, Today’s Litigation, and Tomorrow’s Challenges, 33 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 369, 371
(2015) (quoting Gregory D. Podolak, Cyber Risk Coverage Litigation Heats Up as Exposure and
the Insurance Market Evolve, A.B.A. INS. COVERAGE LITIG. (June 13, 2014), http://
apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/insurance/articles/marchapril2014-cyber-risk-litiga-
tion.html) (discussing the surge in cyber risks in society across all aspects of society).
48. See Roberta D. Anderson, Viruses, Trojans and Spyware, Oh My! The Yellow Brick Road
to Coverage in the Land of Internet Oz, 49 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 529, 530–42 (2014)
(discussing data breach impact in terms of costs, reputation, and organizations’ survival); Podo-
lak, Insurance for Cyber Risks, supra note 47, at 371–75. R
49. See PONEMON INST., FIFTH ANNUAL BENCHMARK STUDY ON PRIVACY & SECURITY OF
HEALTHCARE DATA 1 (2015), https://media.scmagazine.com/documents/121/healthcare_privacy_
security_be_30019.pdf (“[M]ajority of healthcare organizations represented in this study have
experienced multiple security incidents and nearly all have faced a data breach.  Despite the
universal risk for data breach, the study found that many organizations lack the funds and re-
sources to protect patient data and are unprepared to meet the changing cyber threat environ-
ment.”); see also HSB Study Shows 69 Percent of Businesses Experienced Hacking Incidents in
the Last Year, BUS. WIRE (June 3, 2015, 11:39 AM) [hereinafter HSB Study Shows], http://www
.businesswire.com/news/home/20150603006200/en/HSB-Study-Shows-69-Percent-Businesses-Ex-
perienced (“[M]ore than half (55 percent) don’t believe their company is dedicating enough
money or trained and experienced personnel to combat the latest hacking techniques.”).
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complying with multiple security frameworks difficult, time-consum-
ing, and expensive.50
Recognizing this under-preparation and under-compliance gap, the
insurance field stepped in and, in the last decade, began offering cyber
insurance.  Cyber insurance is insurance designed to provide both
first-party loss and third-party liability coverage for data breach
events, privacy violations, and cyberattacks.51  Although there is varia-
tion in the types of policies being offered, insurers offering cyber in-
surance provide some risk shifting for the costs associated with having
to respond, investigate, defend, and mitigate against the consequences
surrounding a data breach event, cyberattack, and privacy violation.52
Organizations are increasingly purchasing cyber insurance to deal
these new risks.53
Insurance companies and institutions, through cyber liability insur-
ance, do not simply pool and transfer an insured’s risk to an insurance
company or provide defense and indemnification services to an in-
sured.  In addition to transferring risk, my empirical research suggests
that cyber insurance provides a series of risk management services
that actively shape the way an organization’s various departments
tasked with dealing with data breach, such as in-house counsel, infor-
mation technology, compliance, public relations, and other organiza-
tional units, respond to data breach.  Cyber insurers are acting as
compliance regulators and trying to prevent, detect, and respond to
data breaches and help organizations comply with various privacy
laws.  Thus, cyber insurers frame the legal environment in terms of
50. Taylor Armerding, ‘Compliance Fatigue’ Sets In, CSO ONLINE (Mar. 20, 2015, 7:44 AM),
http:// www.csoonline.com/article/2899612/compliance/compliance-fatigue-sets-in.html (discuss-
ing how compliance with multiple security frameworks is difficult, time-consuming, and
expensive).
51. See Amy Elizabeth Stewart, Insurance Law Update: It’s Not Just the Other Guy, 70 AD-
VOC. (TEX.) 248, 257–58 (2015) (explaining the basic features of cyber insurance). See generally
William T. Um, Is Cyberinsurance the New ‘Must Have’ Policy?, L.A. DAILY J., Nov. 12, 2014.
52. Id.
53. Whereas most companies did not have cyber insurance a decade ago, one in three organi-
zations now have insurance specifically protecting against cyber and data theft losses.  Deirdre
Fernandes, More Firms Buying Insurance for Data Breaches, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 17, 2014),
www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/02/07.  In 2013, cyber insurance policies sold to retailers,
hospitals, banks, and other businesses rose 20% according to Marsh LLC, a New York insurance
brokerage firm that tracks the market. Id. See generally HSB Study Shows, supra note 49.  The R
United States cyber insurance market is approximately 90% of the global market, with annual
gross written premiums estimated around 2 billion for 2014 and 1.3 billion in 2013.  Stephane
Hurtaud et al., Cyber Insurance as One Element of the Cyber Risk Management Strategy, INSIDE,
Jan. 2015, at 92–97.
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risk and then encourage corporations to use their risk management
services to avoid data breaches and privacy law violations.54
Drawing from interviews and participant observation at cyber insur-
ance conferences across the country and content analysis of cyber in-
surance policies, loss prevention manuals, cyber insurance risk
management services, and webinars, I conducted an empirical study
that reveals that insurers absorb many of the responsibilities of an or-
ganization’s information technology department with risk manage-
ment services that they offer and try to prevent and detect data
breaches before they occur.55  Many of the issues that arise during a
data breach that are often handled by internal departments within an
organization, such as legal, compliance, information technology and
public relations/crisis management, are now being assisted and guided
by insurance industry professionals or third-party vendors that insur-
ance companies offer to assist organizations at a reduced fee.56  Cyber
insurance provides a pathway for insurance institutions to act as exter-
nal compliance monitors and managers of organizational behavior
with respect to data theft.  Given the under-preparation and under-
compliance by businesses, institutionalized risk management tech-
niques developed within the insurance field can potentially improve
organizational practices and compliance concerning data breach.57
Before diving into the risk management tools and tactics that insur-
ers use to assist organizations with complying with privacy laws and
preventing data breach events, it is important to acknowledge that
cyber policies are somewhat different than other insurance lines.
Cyber insurers are able to position themselves as regulatory in-
54. Cyber insurer risk framing of the legal environment of corporations is consistent with how
the insurance field frames the legal environment of employers.  See Talesh, Legal Intermediaries,
supra note 6, at 210–31 (showing how the insurance field frames the legal environment in terms R
of risk).
55. For a more elaborate analysis of the empirical study that I conducted, see Shauhin Talesh,
Data Breach, Privacy, and Cyber Insurance: How Insurance Companies Act as “Compliance
Managers” for Businesses, L. & SOC. INQUIRY doi:10.1111/lsi.12303 (2017).
56. Id. at 9–19; see David L. Hudson, Jr., Cyber Liability Insurance Is an Increasingly Popular,
Almost Necessary Choice for Law Firms, A.B.A. L.J. (Apr. 1, 2015, 3:20 AM), http://www.
abajournal.com/magazine/article/cyber_liability_insurance_is_increasingly_popular_almost_ne
cessary_choice (“‘[S]ome carriers go beyond just offering an insurance policy and also offer risk
management services which firms can use to further protect against these exposures.  These ser-
vices can actually be quite robust and innovative.  Finally, insureds are able to tap into a built-in
network of IT experts, PR firms and legal counsel experienced in cyber matters, which brings an
enormous amount of value to the coverage.’  Most carriers ‘offer a menu of coverages which can
be selected depending upon an insured’s specific needs.’” (quoting Chris Andrews, Vice Presi-
dent, Professional Liability, AIG)).
57. Id. (arguing that insurer risk management in this context is less about shaping law and
more about protecting the corporation from data breach).
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termediaries by offering expansive coverage for privacy and data
breach violations where property, commercial general liability, errors
and omissions, and other lines of insurance often exclude coverage.58
Moreover, unlike some lines of insurance, cyber insurance provides
both first and third-party coverage for data breach events, privacy vio-
lations, and cyber-attacks.59  Cyber insurance covers the insured when
the organization experiences a data breach but also obtains coverage
for liability to others such as consumers to whom the insured is liable
to.  Cyber insurance also covers the costs that flow from a data breach,
including the costs to notify and monitor the credit of the victims, per-
form a forensic investigation, and handle the public relations cam-
paign to maintain and restore the public’s trust in the organization.60
Insurance companies do not just influence organizations through
the policies they issue.  Insurers do more.  Insurance companies offer-
ing cyber insurance influence how organizations comply with privacy
laws and deal with data breach events through a variety of risk man-
agement services.  The risk management services are aimed at
preventing, detecting, and responding to data breach.  My fieldwork
revealed that the insurance industry and the private organizations
purchasing this insurance were in “partnership” with one another.61
One of the reasons organizations purchase this insurance is to gain
access to the insurance company vendor’s that assist with helping pre-
vent, detect, and respond to data breach.62  Seventy percent of the
panels that I attended and observed at cyber insurance conferences
mentioned or promoted the value of the risk management services
that accompany cyber policies.63  Thus, cyber insurance and the ac-
companying risk management services that come with the insurance
provide a pathway for insurance companies to influence organiza-
tional decision-making and response concerning cybersecurity compli-
ance issues.
58. See Hurtaud et al., supra note 53, at 95 fig.2 (highlighting how cyber coverage provides R
coverage for a series of risks that other lines of insurance occasionally cover).
59. See Anderson, supra note 48, at 529, 591–607.  See generally Hurtaud et al., supra note 53; R
Um, supra note 51.  I should be clear that cyber insurance is not the only line of insurance to R
offer both first and third-party insurance.  For example, homeowners and auto insurance also
offer first and third-party insurance.  However, many other lines of insurance offer either first or
third.  Thus, insurers that package first and third-party coverage together is generally considered
more expansive coverage than one that offers one or the other.
60. See Anderson, supra note 48, at 564–65; Hurtaud et al., supra note 53, at 93–95; Um, supra R
note 51.  Cyber insurance is expansive but it is not all encompassing.  In particular, cyber insurers R
insist on sizeable deductibles and exclude the direct costs associated with paying a “ransom” to
unlock malware, the direct costs of  reputation and data destruction.
61. See Talesh, Data Breach, supra note 55, at 12. R
62. See id.
63. Id. at 12–14.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-2\DPL209.txt unknown Seq: 16  7-JUL-17 10:58
478 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:463
Cyber insurers engage in considerable risk and loss prevention on
behalf of the organizations that purchase their insurance and absorb
many of the functions of the organizations in terms of preventing
risks.  Risk prevention takes a series of forms, including conducting
cyber health checks and audits that evaluate the kinds of cyber secur-
ity practices that the organization is maintaining.64  After the evalua-
tion is made, a health score is provided and the insurer offers
recommendations concerning the organization’s security and privacy
practices.65  Insurers then “scan” hidden risks on public-facing infra-
structures, provide a detailed view of a company’s vulnerability status,
and prioritize vulnerabilities.66  The insurer or the third-party vendor
test the effectiveness of existing firewalls and web and e-mail servers
and try to mitigate vulnerabilities.  Insurers that I spoke with framed
these services as very valuable because they go well beyond what
many existing organizations currently offer in terms of cybersecurity
protections.
In addition to trying to prevent data breach events from occurring,
insurers offer services that try to detect breaches before they occur.
For example, insurers offer “shunning” analysis.67  Shunning uses in-
telligence and security technology to isolate and literally shun commu-
nications to and from IP addresses currently being used by criminals.68
Professionals in the cyber security community that I studied repeat-
edly described these services offered by insurers and their third-party
vendors as helpful.69
Insurers also regulate the relationships that organizations enter into
with subcontractors that corporations contract with to perform ser-
vices.  Organizations face legal risks when hiring subcontractors be-
cause organizations may be held legally liable for its subcontractor’s
64. See NETDILIGENCE, CYBER RISK ASSESSMENTS (2016), https://netdiligence.com/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2016/05/NetDiligence_QuietAudit-Assessments_2016-1.pdf.  The cyber health
check and evaluation is quite comprehensive, in that it evaluates (1) current events; (2) security
policy; (3) security organization; (4) asset classification and control; (5) personnel security; (6)
physical and environmental security; (7) computer and network management; (8) system devel-
opment and maintenance; (9) business continuity planning; (10) security compliance; (11) in-
ternet liability; and (12) privacy and regulatory compliance. See id.; see also Talesh, Data Breach,
supra note 55 (manuscript at 21) (highlighting how cyber health checks operate). R
65. See Talesh, Data Breach, supra note 55, at 13.
66. See Cyber Insurance, AIG, http://www.aig.com/business/insurance/cyber-insurance (last
visited Aug. 11, 2016); Security Services, IBM, https://www-03.ibm.com/secutiry/services/cyber
security-assessment/ (last visited Aug. 11, 2016); see aslo Talesh, Data Breach, supra note 55 R
(manuscript at 21).
67. See Cyber Insurance, supra note 66 (discussing how shunning works to prevent data R
breach events); Talesh, Data Breach, supra note 55, at 14. R
68. See Cyber Insurance, supra note 66. R
69. See Talesh, Data Breach, supra note 55, at 12–14. R
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data loss.  To address this legal threat, the insurance field offers ser-
vices that help measure and monitor the networks of vendors that an
organization works with.70  By providing this information to organiza-
tions considering which vendors to use, insurers allow organizations
access into its vendor’s security practices.  This increases the likeli-
hood that organizations will contract with cybersecure vendors and
avoid legal liability.  Thus, insurance companies are regulatory in-
termediaries because they help organizations identify subcontractors
that are less likely to trigger a privacy law violation that will be im-
puted to the organization.  In doing so, insurers help organizations
properly interpret, implement, and comply with privacy laws.
Focusing on prevention and detection allows insurers to coach orga-
nizations on how to strengthen their cyber risk management pro-
gram.71  In doing so, the insurance company absorbs many of the
functions of the information technology department and actively en-
gages in loss prevention in a manner that organizations find quite
efficient.
Consistent with scholars who are optimistic about the role of insur-
ance-as-regulation, these risk prevention tools and security ratings
play an important regulatory role over organizations.  The scans and
health checks are sometimes used as a precondition for determining
whether a potential company is eligible for cyber insurance.  Organi-
zations interested in insurance protection, therefore, are often inter-
ested in becoming more cyber secure.  Also, the more a company is
cyber secure and has good preventative tools in place, the greater like-
lihood the insurance company will lower premiums.
1. Insurer Risk-Management Services Strengthen Organizational
Compliance Through Written Training Materials and
Telephone Hotlines that They Offer
Risk assessments and audits are not the only ways that insurers reg-
ulate the decision making and behavior of organizations.  Insurers
construct the meaning of compliance through a series of written value-
added services that focus on advising organizations on how to prevent
and detect data breaches.  The written materials offered by insurers
are quite comprehensive.  Cyber insurers offer organizations hundreds
of forms and documents, including access to cyber news and blogs,
70. See id. at 14 (discussing how insurers screen the cyber security practices of the prospective
subcontractors and provide information to the organizations so that they can choose cyber se-
cure partners).
71. See id. at 12–14. In fact, many panelists at conferences and many organization representa-
tives that I talked with referred to cyber insurers as effective coaches.
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best-practices checklists, monthly newsletters, articles and
whitepapers, videos, and webinars, and legal summaries and updates,
including some that address new and amended privacy laws.72  These
documents advise organizations on how to avoid fines and liability for
data breach.  Cyber insurers also evaluate an organization’s written
policies, procedures, forms and handbooks to determine if they com-
ply with federal and state law.  In particular, these written audits focus
on interpreting privacy laws and preventing breaches that lead to reg-
ulatory fines.73  Finally, organizations are provided access to an in-
surer-run website that includes resources on how to train staff, to
identify exposure to loss, and to stay informed as compliance issues
evolve.74  In this respect, insurers are shaping the way that private or-
ganizations comply with privacy law challenges on the ground.
Insurers offer an incident response hotline made up of subject mat-
ter experts who know the latest vulnerabilities and cyber risk land-
scape and are able to provide specialized knowledge to clients to
ensure that their cyber infrastructure is secure.  Cyber insurer hotlines
are focused not on offering legal advice (unlike EPLI insurer risk
management services that I will discuss later in this article), but on
heightening the security systems of companies and preventing any
data loss.75
Taken collectively, these risk management services have potential
positive impacts on compliance.  No organization or consumer wants
to have their data compromised.  Insurance companies offering these
services may reflect some best practices, prevent data theft breaches,
and lead to improved compliance.  To the extent it does, both consum-
ers and organizations greatly benefit.  Moreover, unlike in other set-
tings such as employment practice liability insurance,76 insurance
72. Id. at 9 fig. 1 (noting that legal interpretation of privacy laws as one of the components);
see, e.g., CyberEdge End-to-End Cyber Risk Management Solutions, AIG, http://www.aig.com/
content/dam/aig/america-canada/us/documents/business/cyber/aig-cyberedge0418finalsingle-bro-
chure.pdf (last visited Aug. 12, 2016); Services, NETDILIGENCE, http://netdiligence.com/services
(last visited Aug. 9, 2016); see also Um, supra note 51. R
73. See Talesh, Data Breach, supra note 55, at 15 (highlighting the wide variety of written R
services offered); see also CyberEdge, supra note 72; Onsite Cyber Risk Assessment, R
NETDILIGENCE, http://netdiligence.com/portfolio/assessment/ (last visited Aug. 9, 2016).
74. See Talesh, Data Breach, supra note 55, at 9 fig. 1 (highlighting the wide variety of written R
services offered).  See generally CyberEdge, supra note 72; Onsite Cyber Risk Assessment, supra R
note 73. R
75. AIG, Cyber Series, IBM Security, YOUTUBE (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=oq4cGHV2WJ0 (explaining that the hotline is “where subject matter experts may be
reached instantly to discuss potential indicators of compromise to determine if, and how, a com-
promise may have occurred, with advice on what immediate steps to take to address vulnerabili-
ties and contagion”).
76. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. R
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company guidance on these issues does not largely focus on how to
avoid litigation, but on how to prevent data theft losses in the first
instance.  Thus, the cyber insurance example provides empirical evi-
dence for the claim that insurers act as risk regulators in ways that
further compliance goals and foster heightened safety and security for
the organizations and most importantly, its clients and customers.
2. Cyber Insurance Provides Risk Management Services that Help
Organizations Respond in the Event of a Data Breach
The regulatory interventions of cyber insurers go beyond risk pre-
vention and detection.  Insurers influence the way that organizations
respond in the event of an actual data breach.  In addition to covering
legal defense and indemnification costs associated with a covered loss,
cyber insurers cover the legal, forensic investigation, business inter-
ruption, crisis management, and credit monitoring and restoration ex-
penses.  However, insurers do not just pay for the costs of these
services, they also provide access to services aimed at responding to,
investigating, defending, and mitigating against the consequences sur-
rounding a data breach event or privacy law violation.77  Insurers con-
tract with third-party vendors that the insured can use or have
departmental units that deal with various cyber-related problems.78
Typically, the insured receives a reduced premium to use the insurer’s
vendors.79  Cyber insurers are providing risk response well beyond the
scope of what insurers typically handle.
Typically, corporations facing a cyber violation have incident re-
sponse teams that manage and coordinate the data security event in-
vestigation, response, reporting and the corrective action taken.  The
incident response team often consists of: a team leader; a privacy of-
ficer; the departments of legal and risk management services, informa-
tion security, human resources, employee relations, and patient
relations; outside legal counsel (who is often the breach coach); a cri-
sis management and public relations person; a forensics person; and
an insurance company or its broker.80  Corporations use and identify
many of the team members from insurance company vendor lists that
insurers provide to corporations.81  Organizations found the access to
77. See Talesh, Data Breach, supra note 55, at 16–19 (highlighting the various value-added R
services that insurance companies offer); see also Anderson, supra note 48, at 603–07 (highlight- R
ing the various value-added services that insurance companies offer).
78. See Talesh, Data Breach, supra note 55, at 16. R
79. See id. at 16.
80. See id. (discussing the key individuals involved in the incident response team).
81. Id.
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these services and the “one-stop shopping” in the event of a data
breach to be invaluable.82
Insurers help with providing organizations access to a designated
panel of lawyers and law firms that can assist in managing the legal
issues that arise when a data breach occurs.83  These law firms help
organizations prepare for and respond to data security incidents and
assist with complying with various privacy laws and regulatory provi-
sions largely focused on making sure consumers are notified in a
timely manner that there is a data breach.84  Legal advice is particu-
larly useful because there are forty-seven state consumer notification
statutes with various requirements.85  Private organizations refer to
these lawyers as their “breach coach,” capable of guiding the organi-
zations through the regulatory maze and making sure organizations
respond in a way that does not trigger further problems.86  In addition
to offering twenty-four hour access via an 800 number, these lawyers
play a critical role in developing and managing the incident response
team that is formed when a data breach occurs.87  Corporations appre-
ciate being able to access a menu of law firms that have already been
screened by the insurer.88
In addition to providing legal expertise, insurance institutions are
the primary source of forensic expertise.  Cyber insurers help organi-
zations respond when a cyber security system is breached, identify the
source and cause of the data breach, contain the breach, and ulti-
mately restore the network processes that may have been damaged as
a result of the breach.89  Cyber insurers or their third-party vendors
offer forensic cyber security experts to organizations.  In my field-
work, access to forensic experts was repeatedly seen as one of the
82. Id.
83. Id. at 17 (discussing how insurers offer organizations access to legal services through their
network).
84. Um, supra note 51 (“[A]ttorneys assist with notification if a data breach occurs and to R
defend lawsuits following such notification.”).
85. Id. (“47 states have consumer notification laws, and policyholders need the assistance of
experienced attorneys to evaluate which state laws have been triggered and what steps policy-
holders must take following a data breach event.”).
86. Talesh, Data Breach, supra note 55, at 17 (discussing the role of the breach coach); see R
Jeffrey D. Brunken, Is Cyber Insurance a Good or Bad Investment?, PHYSICIANS PRAC. (Nov. 24,
2013), http://www.physicianspractice.com/print/189788 (noting breach coach provides a main
point of contact for the policyholder).
87. See Talesh, Data Breach, supra note 55, at 17 (noting the pivotal role the breach coach R
plays).
88. Id. at 16–18.
89. Id. at 17–18 (discussing the need for the forensic expert to come in and address the data
security breach); Um, supra, note 51, at 1 (discussing the need to contain the source of the R
breach and restore the network processes).
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most valuable services offered by cyber insurers.90  Cyber insurers not
only provide the insured access to these vendors, but they cover the
costs to retain information security forensics experts, identify the
source of the breach, contain the breach, and restore the network
processes back to normal.91
Another major threat organizations face when a data breach occurs
is severe or even terminal damage to its reputation.92  Cyber insurance
addresses this risk by covering the costs to retain the services of a
public relations and crisis management firm.93  However, cyber insur-
ers go beyond providing coverage by offering a series of preapproved
public relations and crisis management firms that the insured can re-
tain at a reduced premium.94  These crisis management and public re-
lations firms develop and provide advertising or related
communications to protect and restore the insured’s reputation fol-
lowing a breach event.
Finally, cyber insurers provide access to companies experienced in
credit monitoring and restoration that organizations can use for a re-
duced fee.95  In addition, cyber insurance covers the costs of credit
monitoring, fraud monitoring and setting up call centers to respond to
customer concerns and inquiries as a result of data loss.96  These
value-added services are crucial because consumers are at risk of
credit and identity theft by hackers when their financial information is
stolen.  Financial institutions, retail stores, and credit card companies
that experience breaches of consumer information often set up credit
monitoring and restoration services for consumers.  This typically also
includes establishing a call center to respond to customer concerns
and inquiries regarding data breach events.  When evaluating the to-
tality of services that the insurers offer organizations, such as the legal
90. Talesh, Data Breach, supra note 55, at 17–18. R
91. Anderson, supra note 48, at 604 (“Cyber risk policies often provide coverage for the inves- R
tigatory costs associated with determining the cause and scope of a breach or attack.”).
92. A Data Breach Isn’t Always a Disaster. Mishandling It Is., BEAZLEY, https://www.beazley
.com/specialty_lines/data_breach.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2016).  In particular, studies show that
a third of customers of companies that suffer a data breach refuse to continue doing business
with that company in the future. Id.
93. Anderson, supra note 48, at 604–05 (“[T]he costs associated with a cyber attack often R
include crisis management activities.”).
94. Talesh, Data Breach, supra note 55, at 18 (noting that in addition to covering the costs R
relating to crisis management, insurers offer policyholders access to firms that specialize in crisis
management).
95. Id. (noting that cyber insurers offer access to organizations that handle credit monitoring
and restoration in addition to paying the costs of such services).
96. Anderson, supra note 48, at 603 (“Cyber risk policies typically provide coverage for the R
costs associated with notification of a data breach and credit monitoring services.”).
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services, forensics, public relations, and crisis management, the insurer
can be seen as the manager and regulator of cyber security risks.
Amidst an environment where organizations are under-complying
with privacy laws and under-prepared for potential data breach events,
cyber insurers are intervening and acting as regulatory intermediaries.
Cyber insurers are doing much more than pooling and spreading risk.
The incident response team for organizations dealing with privacy
laws and cyber breaches is heavily influenced by insurers.  In addition
to providing defense and indemnification for losses resulting from
data breaches, insurers are involved in the legal, forensic, information
technology, credit monitoring, and public relations decisions relating
to a data breach event.  Insurers either offer an insured its risk man-
agement services or access to its network of third-party vendors who
specialize in dealing with these various issues.  By offering a series of
risk management services developed within the insurance field that
are aimed at preventing, detecting, and responding to cyber security
breaches, insurance institutions actively shape the way an organization
responds to data theft.  Consistent with Logue and Ben-Shahar’s con-
cept of insurance as risk regulation, insurers are acting as regulators in
a way that better protects consumers and organizations.  In this re-
spect, the cyber insurance example is consistent with insurance law
scholars’ argument that insurance risk management can improve com-
pliance and reduce moral hazard behavior of organizations.  However,
I extend the analysis by highlighting the specific risk management
techniques insurers use to curb data breach events from occurring.
B. Insurance Risk Management in the Corporate Securities
Law Context: The Bad
Despite the obvious financial incentives insurers have for getting
involved in the cyber security risk management market, the cyber in-
surance example highlights how insurer risk management services can
help curb the under-compliance and under-preparation gaps that or-
ganizations encounter when dealing with cyber threats.  In particular,
insurance company interventions aimed at preventing, detecting and
responding to cyber threats simultaneously help the regulated entities
(organizations who do not want to experience a data breach) but also
help consumers (who do not want their private information compro-
mised).  Although not perfect, insurance institutions help corporations
protect client and customer data and behave in a more socially re-
sponsible manner.
Insurance companies do not, however, always have positive out-
comes as corporate regulators.  Insurance companies offering direc-
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tors’ and officers’ liability insurance highlight how insurance
companies are not always effective substitutes as regulators.  If insur-
ance companies as corporate regulators dealing with privacy and
cybersecurity issues are largely positive, here, insurance company be-
havior as corporate regulators of directors and officers are largely
negative.
In particular, direct litigation by shareholders is an important regu-
latory mechanism over U.S. corporations.  Given the limits of public
regulation, a variety of legal tools are left in the hands of sharehold-
ers.  Shareholders that believe they have been wronged by the corpo-
ration that they have invested in can sue as a class or on behalf of the
company itself to seek relief.  This litigation is often referred to as
“shareholder litigation.”97  Broadly, shareholder litigation refers to all
civil actions brought by current or former shareholders of a corpora-
tion against the corporation or its managers for losses the sharehold-
ers suffer as a result of actions taken by the corporation and its
managers.98  Acting as a private attorney general, shareholders have
strong personal incentives to detect and prosecute corporate wrong-
doing.99  Such litigation is supposed to deter corporate misconduct
and serve as a regulatory check on directors and officers tasked with
managing and running the corporation.100
In response to the very real threat of shareholder litigation, officers
and directors of corporate entities often obtain Directors’ and Of-
ficers’ Liability Insurance (D&O insurance).  This insurance protects
officers and directors from personal liability in the event of share-
holder litigation.101  Moreover, D&O insurance also protects the cor-
poration itself from liability it may have in connection with
shareholder litigation.  D&O insurance transfers the obligations of the
prospective bad actor (officer, director, or corporation itself) to an
97. See, e.g., TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: HOW
LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 3–5 (2010) (explaining share-
holder litigation); Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder
Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 135–36 (2004); see also Jill
E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private Securities Litigation, 2009 WIS. L. REV.
333, 339 n.24, 340 n.27 (2009); Paul Weitzel, The End of Shareholder Litigation? Allowing Share-
holders to Customize Enforcement Through Arbitration Provisions in Charters and Bylaws, 2013
B.Y.U. L. REV. 65, 67 (2013).
98. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 97, at 3. R
99. Id. at 1 (noting that public regulators cannot oversee every company and thus sharehold-
ers have “strong personal incentives to detect and prosecute corporate wrongdoing”).
100. Id. at 1–2.  The deterrence impact here is that prospective wrongdoers realize that they
may be sued for any harms that they cause and thus have a strong incentive to not engage in
corporate misconduct. Id.
101. For a thorough explanation of directors’ and officers’ insurance, see id. at 10–13.
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insurer which pays for defense and indemnification.102  Thus, one con-
cern is that D&O insurance potentially decreases the deterrence func-
tion of shareholder litigation by making it easier for directors and
officers to pass these risks and responsibilities to the insurance
company.103
By offering D&O insurance, however, insurers act as a third-party
intermediary in the regulatory scheme.  In this situation, directors’
and officers’ insurers have a great opportunity to influence corporate
conduct through the insurance relationship to potentially help direc-
tors and officers avoid shareholder litigation.104  After all, if insurers
are ultimately going to have to pay for the harms caused by their cor-
porate insureds, insurers have ample incentive to exert a regulatory
influence over the directors and officers, and have the opportunity to
do so.  D&O underwriters conduct a thorough examination of the
governance features of prospective insureds, evaluate risk factors and
structural governance features.  D&O insurers have opportunities to
influence corporate conduct through underwriting, monitoring and
the settlement of claims.  In theory, this provides a basis for loss-pre-
vention guidance.  Successful oversight of directors and officer behav-
ior and conduct would preserve shareholder litigation as a regulatory
device and encourage corporate actors to engage in compliant
behavior.
However, empirical research suggests that although D&O insurers
have an opportunity to influence the behavior of directors and officers
and discourage wrongful and even illegal behavior by acting as regula-
102. Id. at 10–11.  To the extent that insurance hinders or weakens deterrence, it undermines
the basic justification for shareholder litigation. Id.
103. Id. at 11 (“This creates a problem for deterrence.  With liability risk transferred to a
third-party insurer, prospective defendants are no longer forced to internalize the full cost of
their actions.  With little or nothing at risk, in other words, they are unlikely to be deterred from
the sorts of actions that may lead to shareholder litigation.”).
104. Baker and Griffith note the powerful ways that D&O insurers could regulate director
and officer behavior:
D&O insurance has the potential to insulate corporations and their managers from the
consequences of liability rules that are expressly designed to penalize bad governance
and encourage good governance.  As a result, the D&O insurer thus assumes a pivotal
role in the analysis.  The question thus becomes, Does the D&O insurer have some
means of passing along the deterrent effect of shareholder litigation or does the fact of
D&O coverage distort or destroy the accountability mechanisms build into shareholder
litigation? In other words, what do D&O insurers do to deter bad acts on the part of
their insureds?  Since, after all, the insurers are the ones ultimately footing the bill for
shareholder claims, they would seem to have ample incentive to control the conduct
that might lead to claims.
BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 97, at 13. R
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tory intermediaries, they rarely do so.105  Tom Baker and Sean Grif-
fith’s empirical study of the relationship between directors’ and
officers’ insurance and corporate actors reveals that D&O insurance
significantly weakens the deterrent effect of shareholder litigation and
thus undermines such private attorney general suits as forms of
regulation.106
Despite having financial incentives to do so, D&O insurers neither
monitor nor provide loss prevention programs to the corporations
they insure.107  In particular, D&O insurers do not condition the sale
of insurance on adopting loss-prevention policies.108  Moreover, bro-
kers and risk managers note that loss prevention advice was not very
valued or binding on public corporations.109  With only one exception,
Baker and Griffith’s research revealed that none of the underwriters
or brokers they interviewed could recall a single situation in which a
publicly traded corporation changed a business practice in response to
a governance concern raised by a D&O insurer.110
Equally important, insurers rarely try to influence or change corpo-
rate behavior.111  While insurers servicing private corporations rou-
tinely provide corporations access to newsletters, conferences, and
written materials relating to good governance, insurers do not condi-
tion insurance coverage on adopting any governance practice, provid-
ing loss-prevention audits, or even providing clear discounts for
adopting what insurers might consider good corporate governance
standards.112  Insurers often resist offering loss prevention advice, in
part, because they cannot empirically show that adopting insurer rec-
ommendations leads to reduced loss.113  Baker and Griffith note that
one insurer who tried to encourage corporations adopt their loss pre-
105. Id. at 126–27 (highlights how insurers fail to engage in loss prevention with directors and
officers).
106. Id. at 103–04, 126–27 (examining how insurers fail to sufficiently deter misconduct
through pricing and underwriting, monitoring, loss prevention, and settlement practices).
107. Id. at 126–27 (finding that insurers have opportunities to engage in loss prevention but
fail to do so).
108. Id. at 109 (finding that “D&O insurers do not condition the sale of insurance on compli-
ance with loss-prevention requirements in any systematic way”).
109. Id. (“Although D&O insurers do occasionally provide loss-prevention advice, underwrit-
ers report—and brokers and risk managers confirm—that this advice is not highly valued by
public corporations, nor is it in any way binding on corporations as, for example, a condition of
policy renewal.”).
110. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 97, at 109. R
111. Id. at 109–10 (“Our participants were nearly unanimous in reporting that insurers are not
successful at getting public companies to change their governance practices, and indeed that they
rarely ever try.”).
112. Id. at 111.
113. Id. at 112–13.
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vention programs ultimately abandoned such an approach: “[W]ithout
a bundled premium discount, companies were unwilling to follow the
insurer’s loss-prevention program, especially when competing insurers
were offering the same insurance without any loss-prevention
requirements.”114
D&O insurance brokers also do not step in and engage in harm or
loss prevention despite opportunities to do so.  Unlike the cyber insur-
ance context where insurers actively engage in loss prevention, bro-
kers do not offer advice about what governance programs are likely to
count negatively when the insurer conducts an underwriting assess-
ment.115  Brokers identify features of the corporation that are likely to
be evaluated positively by insurers;116 however, insurers do not make
attempts to nudge the corporation in a more compliant direction.117
Although brokers negotiate with insurers to structure the various lay-
ers of insurance and use market power to pressure insurers to settle
when claims are made, they do not monitor corporate insureds.
What does all this mean for corporate executives that are the target
of shareholder litigation?  It means that corporate executives purchase
D&O insurance with shareholder money and essentially shift the vast
majority of malfeasance and misconduct risks away from themselves
while operating at a publicly traded company.  Insurers offer little ad-
vice or risk management and top executives ask for little assistance in
monitoring or managing the day-to-day operations.  Thus, corporate
officers are able to gain the benefits of insurance coverage and protec-
tion without yielding any control over the day-to-day operation of the
corporation.  Corporate executives are able to purchase and gain
these benefits at the expense of the shareholders.118
Directors’ and officers’ insurers not only fail to play a role in the
monitoring and oversight of corporate executives, but also fail to exert
control over defense and settlement.  In theory, insurers could man-
age defense and settlement of shareholder claims, fight frivolous
114. Id.
115. Id. at 113–14.  Baker and Griffith noted that “advice about how to avoid a negative
underwriting assessment and put one’s best foot forward in the market for insurance is relatively
piecemeal—a far cry from a comprehensive program about how to implement structures that
will avoid D&O losses.  Brokers principally offer marketing advice.” Id. at 113.
116. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 97, at 113–14. R
117. Id. at 116 (“The broker helps the prospective insured put its best foot forward in purchas-
ing insurance, but the broker does not counsel his or her client on how to modify its corporate
governance structure.”).
118. As Baker and Griffith note, “Top executives in public corporations are thus able to
purchase income-smoothing insurance without ceding any governance authority to insurers be-
cause this purchase, like all such decisions, is insulated from shareholder challenge by the busi-
ness-judgment rule.” Id. at 127.
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claims, manage defense costs, and withhold insurance benefits from
directors and officers who have engaged in actual fraud.  Specifically,
insurers could make sure that cases are resolved on the merits and
that settlement amounts bear a close relationship to the harm caused
by the director so the insurance loss costs used in the D&O insurance
pricing formulas provide the right signal.  Moreover, insurers could
force defendants in the worst cases of egregious misconduct to pay
more toward the defense and settlement of their claims.  This would
incentivize corporate insureds to avoid the kinds of misconduct that
leads to a reduction in coverage.  However, empirical research in this
area suggests that insurers do very little to effectively manage defense
and settlement.  Although D&O insurers sometimes use their settle-
ment control to extract concessions from corporate defendants, the
settlement process often prevents D&O insurers from requiring that
final settlement amounts track the underlying merit of claims.119  Al-
though insurers have some control over settlements, they have very
little control over the conduct of the defense.120  Baker and Griffith
note, “Our criticisms of the process revolve principally around the
lack of transparency of D&O insurance program structure and pricing
as well as the precise contribution of D&O insurers to class action
settlements.”121
In sum, insurance companies are doing a very poor job of acting as
corporate regulators in the directors and officers context.  Even
though D&O insurers are in a position regulate the behavior of direc-
tors and officers, they do very little to monitor and control the con-
duct of their corporate insureds.  In theory, loss prevention should be
a routine part of the package of services that any insurer provides.
After all, insurers have the right incentives, the means to hire the
proper experts, and shareholders and officers should highly value this
service.  Although loss prevention and risk management programs are
common in other areas of insurance, they are typically not offered by
D&O insurers in a meaningful way.  Moreover, when loss prevention
advice is provided, it is communicated as a suggestion rather than as a
119. Id. at 174–75.  In particular, factors that influence settlement values include “(1) investor
loss, (2) insurance limits and structure, (3) sex appeal, (4) litigation dynamics, and (5) statistical
information from other settlements.  Although some of these features clearly have mer-
its–relevant aspects, notably investor loss and sex appeal, others, such as insurance limits and
structure and litigation dynamics, clearly do not, and we tend to doubt that settlement statistics
as used today push in the merits-relevant direction.” Id. at 176.
120. See id. at 128–51.  In particular, “D&O insurance policies give insurers no direct control
over the conduct of the defense and how, in fact, D&O insurers have little ability to control
defense costs.  Their authority over settlements is significantly constrained by the threat of being
found to have acted in bad faith by unreasonably withholding consent to settle.” Id. at 150–51.
121. Id. at 176.
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mandate and is designed more to promote or market the insurer than
to restrict the conduct of the insured.  While capable of engaging in
corporate oversight and regulation, insurers simply sell this insurance
at a profit to a population eager to purchase such insurance.  D&O
insurers play little to no role in regulatory oversight.122  Moreover, the
impact of shareholder litigation on directors and officers can now be
more easily passed off to insurers without causing the corporate of-
ficers much discomfort.  Thus, similar to the cyber security context,
the interests of the consumer and corporation are aligned, but in this
instance insurers fail as regulators.  The D&O insurance example
highlights an example of how insurer risk management does not in-
duce positive regulatory outcomes.
C. Insurance Risk Management in the Employment and Anti-
Discrimination Law Context: The Ugly
If insurance company regulator interventions are relatively helpful
concerning corporations dealing with privacy laws and cyber security
threats, and unhelpful in preventing corporate misconduct, then in-
surer regulatory interventions in the employment law context can be
described as at best, ugly.  I use the term “ugly” because whereas
D&O insurers had opportunities to engage in loss prevention and dis-
courage wrongful or even illegal conduct but failed to do so, employ-
ment practice liability insurers do offer risk management and loss
prevention advice but do so in a way that often weakens the meaning
of anti-discrimination law and reframes anti-discrimination law
around a focus on risk and litigation avoidance.
The rise of Employment Practice Liability Insurance (EPLI) illus-
trates how insurance institutions mediate the meaning of compliance
with civil rights legislation and how these constructions of compliance
end up being deferred to and legitimated by public legal institutions.
Prior to the development of employment discrimination law, workers
suffering workplace discrimination or harassment seldom sought or
brought lawsuits.123  Title VII and other civil rights laws try to convert
the guarantees established by the U.S. Constitution into legislation
122. I do not mean to suggest that it is very easy for insurers to act as regulators.  In the
corporate securities context, a series of institutional barriers prevent D&O insurers from bun-
dling loss-prevention programs with D&O insurance, including 1) a lack of underwriter knowl-
edge and experience; 2) characteristics of securities misinformation losses that may make
monitoring futile or prohibitively costly; 3) the layered, excess-of-loss structure of D&O insur-
ance programs; and 4) the insurance underwriting cycle. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 97, at R
118–24.
123. Joan Gabel et al., Evolving Conflict Between Standards for Employment Discrimination
Liability and the Delegation of That Liability: Does Employment Practices Liability Insurance
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that addresses specific issues such as workplace discrimination and
harassment.124
In response to perceived threats of employment discrimination law-
suits, insurance companies began offering EPLI.  Unlike prior forms
of business insurance that expressly excludes coverage for liability
arising out of employment practices, EPLI provides employers with
the ability to manage the increasing litigation risk associated with dis-
crimination, sexual harassment, wrongful termination, and other
breaches of employment law.125  EPLI policies provide insurance de-
fense and indemnification coverage to employers for claims of dis-
crimination (e.g., age, sex, race, disability) and other employment-
related allegations made by employees, former employees, or poten-
tial employees.126
Insurers increasingly offer EPLI and employers increasingly
purchase this insurance.  Whereas only a few insurance companies in
the 1990s offered EPLI, now over seventy insurance companies offer
EPLI and many large employers purchase EPLI.127  Insurers play a
role in averting such risk and act as a regulatory intermediary because
employers have an incentive to avoid discrimination; however, insur-
ers do so in a way that focuses on avoiding litigation rather than fos-
tering a discrimination-free work environment.
Specifically, my fieldwork revealed how the insurance field (insur-
ance companies, agents, brokers, and risk management consultants),
through EPLI and the accompanying risk management services that
Offer Appropriate Risk Transference?, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 5 (2001) (noting that litigat-
ing over discrimination is a relatively recent phenomenon).
124. Title VII in particular states in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin
. . . .
Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012); see also Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012))
(emphasizing the deterrent effect of financial liability by providing compensatory and punitive
damages for disparate treatment lawsuits brought by private plaintiffs). See generally U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
125. See Joan T.A. Gabel et al., The Peculiar Moral Hazard of Employment Practices Liability
Insurance: Realignment of the Incentive to Transfer Risk with the Incentive to Prevent Discrimina-
tion, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 639, 640, 650–51 (2006) (highlighting the rise of
EPLI); see also Gabel et al., Evolving Conflict, supra note 123, at 28–30. R
126. See Nancy H. Van der Veer, Note, Employment Practices Liability Insurance: Are EPLI
Policies a License to Discriminate? Or Are They a Necessary Reality Check for Employers?, 12
CONN. INS. L.J. 173, 175–77 (2005) (explaining what is EPLI is and the range of coverage).
127. See Talesh, A New Institutional Theory of Insurance, supra note 5, at 626 (noting the
increase in the number of insurers and employers that offer and purchase this insurance).
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the field offers, construct the threat of employment law and influence
the nature of civil rights compliance.128  Drawing from participant ob-
servation and interviews at EPLI conferences across the country as
well as content analysis of EPLI policies, loss-prevention manuals,
EPLI industry guidelines, and webinars, my empirical data suggest
that insurance companies and institutions use a risk-based logic and
institutionalize a way of thinking centered on risk management and
reduction.129  Faced with uncertain and unpredictable legal risk con-
cerning potential discrimination violations, insurance institutions ele-
vate the risk and threat in the legal environment and offer a series of
risk-management services that they argue will avert risk for employers
that purchase EPLI.130  By framing employers’ legal environment in
terms of uncertain legal risk,131 heightened litigation risk,132 and the
need for risk reduction,133 the insurance industry creates a space to
encourage employers to engage in managerialized responses and de-
velop formalized policies and procedures by using the various risk-
management services offered by insurers to help reduce these risks.
My empirical research in this area went beyond analyzing the un-
certain legal risks employers face and the high likelihood that employ-
ers are going to be sued.  My fieldwork revealed that insurers
encourage employers to purchase EPLI because these insurance poli-
cies and the value-added risk management services that insurers offer
will reduce employers’ risk.134  In particular, EPLI insurers offer a va-
128. For a thorough explanation of how insurers focus their guidance on avoiding litigation
rather than a discrimination-free work environment, see id. at 626–32; Talesh, Legal Intermedi-
aries, supra note 6, at 209–34. R
129. See Talesh, Legal Intermediaries, supra note 6, at 219–21. R
130. Id. at 219–23 tbls.1, 2, 3 & 4 (highlighting a series of examples of how insurers frame legal
risk as uncertain, heighten litigation risk, and encourage reducing risk).
131. Uncertain legal risk refers to the risk of loss to an organization based on some violation
of law.  My empirical research reveals that insurers frame employers’ legal risk as uncertain,
vague, and unpredictable. See id. at 218–19 for comprehensive analysis of how the insurer field
frames employers’ legal risk as uncertain.
132. Insurance field actors heighten the litigation risk facing employers by routinely discussing
the growth, burden, and cost of employment lawsuits in documentary data and webinars: “Not-
for-profit corporations and public entities, in addition to public and private businesses, are ex-
periencing an explosion of employment-related claims.” GARY W. GRIFFIN ET AL., THE EPL
BOOK: THE PRACTICAL GUIDE TO EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES LIABILITY AND INSURANCE 1 (3d
ed. 2001).  For further analysis of how the insurer field heightens employers’ litigation risk, see
Talesh, Legal Intermediaries, supra note 6, at 219–21. R
133. Talesh, Legal Intermediaries, supra note 6, at 221 (“Once the insurance field frames the R
legal risks facing employers as uncertain but elevated and likely to occur, the insurance field
encourages employers and risk management consultants to avert or reduce this risk by purchas-
ing EPLI insurance and the accompanying risk-management services.”).  For further analysis of
how the insurer field encourages employers to reduce and avert risk by purchasing EPLI, see id.
at 221–23.
134. Id. at 223–31.
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riety of risk-management services to employers that try to provide a
regulatory check on employer discriminatory practices.  ELPI insurers
conduct compliance audits of employers and offer employers a confi-
dential legal hotline that allows employers to ask legal questions to
insurer-sponsored lawyers.135  They also provide employee handbooks
and employment “contract builders” to employers so that they can
construct a handbook and develop contracts without actually drafting
the documents.136
Insurer risk-management services can have positive and negative
impacts on compliance.  On the one hand, insurer risk management
practices may reflect some best practices and lead to improved em-
ployment policies and procedures.  On the other hand, they may also
make it easier for employers to develop policies and procedures with-
out actively participating in the creation of these policies and proce-
dures.  In particular, insurance company guidance on these issues
largely focuses on how to avoid litigation as opposed to focusing on
EPLI insurers’ often-stated goal of providing mechanisms for building
a discrimination-free work environment.137
Whereas insurers in the privacy context focus less on interpreting or
influencing the meaning of privacy law, EPLI insurers influence the
meaning of compliance with anti-discrimination laws in a number of
ways.  First, conferences, training programs, loss-prevention manuals,
and insurance policy language provide an opportunity for the insur-
ance field actors to build discretion into legal rules.138  In other words,
insurance companies develop policy language, which provides work-
arounds to certain legal rules clearly forbidding insurance coverage
for certain acts or omissions in civil rights contexts.
For example, the insurability of punitive damages highlights how
the insurance field builds discretion into legal rules.  Even though civil
rights laws can potentially subject employers to punitive damages and
many states prohibit the insurability of such damages,139 EPLI insur-
ers build discretion into their policies and broaden coverage to include
135. Id. at 229 (discussing risk-management programs insurers offer, including telephone hot-
lines, audits, and a series of written materials that employers can use to create, develop, or
enhance their own employment practice materials).
136. Id. at 230–31.
137. Id. at 222–25.
138. See id. at 225–26.
139. See RICHARD S. BETTERLEY, BETTERLEY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC., EMPLOYMENT PRAC-
TICES LIABILITY INSURANCE MARKET SURVEY 2012: RATES CONTINUE TO FIRM, BUT NOT FOR
ALL CARRIERS 9 (2012) (“We understand that there are 16 states that prohibit or restrict cover-
age for either Punitive Damages and/or Intentional Acts . . . .”), http://betterley.com/samples/
EPLI12_nt.pdf.
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punitive damages by including “most favored venue” clauses into their
policies.140  In particular, these clauses indicate that the enforceability
of insurance coverage shall be governed by the applicable law that
most favors coverage for punitive and exemplary damages.  Not sur-
prisingly, insurance companies list state jurisdictions in their policies,
which the insurance companies must consult in determining insurabil-
ity, that often permit coverage for punitive damages.141  Thus, even
though statutes and caselaw often prohibit coverage for punitive dam-
ages, these damages are covered by EPLI.  Under the framework of
risk management and risk aversion, EPLI limits the ability of state
and federal civil rights laws to hold employers directly responsible for
paying punitive damages because employers now have the ability to
transfer these costs to insurers.  Unlike the D&O context where insur-
ers fail to step into the regulatory void concerning corporate malfea-
sance, EPLI insurers are stepping in and providing services in a
manner that makes the regulatory impact of certain anti-discrimina-
tion laws harder to achieve.
Insurance companies also reframe legal rules and principles around
a nonlegal risk logic that focuses on averting risk and making discrimi-
nation claims against employers more defensible.  For example, insur-
ers spend considerable time at conferences and training sessions
discussing workplace bullying—a relatively new workplace issue that
is now being increasingly litigated by plaintiffs’ lawyers.142  Although
insurance institutions have an opportunity to encourage more lawful
conduct in light of changing anti-discrimination laws, insurance field
actors shift responsibility for fostering a safe and positive workplace
away from employers.  They do so by communicating how EPLI pro-
vides coverage for employers in the event that an employee is found
liable for bullying: “Don’t worry.  EPLI has a catch all for these situa-
tions. Bullying claims fall within the definition of wrongful act in the
policy—it is a wrongful workplace policy or procedure.”143  Thus,
whereas insurers in the cyber security context coach organizations on
how to prevent a data breach from occurring, here insurers are simply
transferring risk without providing preventative guidance.
140. For a thorough examination of how employment practice liability insurers develop ways
to provide coverage for punitive damages against its insureds, see Talesh, Legal Intermediaries,
supra note 6, at 223–25. R
141. Id. at 224.  In addition, many insurers have offshore facilities in Bermuda and London or
enter into relationships with foreign insurance companies to provide “wrap around” policies that
will ultimately pay employers’ punitive damages liability. Id. at 225.
142. Id. at 228.
143. Id. at 227–28.
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Another example of how insurers reframe legal rules around con-
cerns over risk is through Performance Improvement Plans (PIPs).
Employment progressive discipline policies, such as PIPs, are often
used as mechanisms to improve employee performance.  PIPs are now
framed by insurance field actors around managing risk and avoiding a
negative inference from a jury at trial.144  Specifically, while employ-
ers’ normal practice is to provide PIPs prior to terminating employees,
the insurance field routinely discourages using PIPs against employees
who might be terminated.145  Experts at conferences spend considera-
ble time discussing whether insurance coverage exists for emerging
forms of liability against employers as opposed to focusing on ways for
employers to avoid committing legal violations in the first instance.146
Thus, although the interventions that insurers provide in these settings
is celebrated as providing a level of regulatory oversight, the reality is
that the insurance field’s message is focused on risk reduction.
Even U.S. Supreme Court decisions are framed by insurance field
actors at conferences that insurers and employers attend around shift-
ing risk and avoiding liability.  When Supreme Court cases concerning
employment law are discussed at EPLI conferences, EPLI risk-man-
agement consultants and lawyers steer employers toward avoiding lia-
bility and defending cases.147  Thus, unlike the directors and officer
context where insurers miss opportunities to engage in insurance loss
prevention, insurers do engage in loss prevention, but do so in a man-
ner that is filtered by risk-management logics.  Law is viewed and un-
derstood as risk.  While my data suggest EPLI and the series of risk-
management services offered with the insurance policy can potentially
144. Id. at 226–27.
145. Id. at 226 (“PIPs are bad for litigation, 80 percent of people who receive a PIP end up
being fired. Jurors view PIPs as a way to set someone up to be fired, especially if the employee
raised a complaint or concern earlier.”).
146. Talesh, Legal Intermediaries, supra note 6, at 226–27. R
147. See Talesh, A New Institutional Theory, supra note 5, at 630–31.  The Supreme Court case R
Vance v. Ball State curtailed the scope of who constitutes a supervisor in sexual harassment cases
is illustrative. See generally Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013).  In Vance, the
Court established that a supervisor is one who has the ability to take tangible employment ac-
tions against the victim, such as hiring, firing, disciplining, promoting, and reassigning an em-
ployee. Id. at 2439–46.
Rather than focusing on the proper role of supervisors, EPLI risk-management consul-
tants and lawyers steer employers toward avoiding liability and defend cases. Risk-
management consultants and attorneys suggest that employers not have many supervi-
sors, selectively use the term “supervisor,” clearly communicate levels of authority, and
avoid behavior that gives an inference that the employee is a supervisor.
Talesh, A New Institutional Theory, supra note 5, at 630.  “Field actors also dissuade employers R
from having lots of employees participate in training programs that could suggest an employee is
a supervisor.  Moreover, employers are encouraged to bring more motions for summary judg-
ment since the law has narrowed the definition of supervisor.” Id.
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improve employment practices and compliance, they also suggest that
EPLI risk-management services may at times shape compliance in a
way that leans more toward making claims defensible rather than fos-
tering a discrimination-free workplace.148
Despite the questionable regulatory outputs of insurers as risk man-
agers in the employment context, my research reveals considerable
deference to EPLI by public legal institutions, such as courts, legisla-
tures, and regulatory institutions.  In particular, federal, state, and mu-
nicipal governments adopt risk logics of EPLI insurers and encourage,
and at times require, public organizations and governmental institu-
tions to purchase EPLI.149  County and city state governments also
increasingly rely upon EPLI and nudge other public entities to obtain
such insurance.150  Moreover, public secondary schools and public uni-
versities often require purchase of EPLI.151
As EPLI becomes an institutionalized service offered by insurers
and purchased by public and private organizations, courts follow suit
by significantly expanding the coverage afforded insureds under EPLI
when interpreting coverage questions.152  The expansive interpreta-
tion of EPLI by courts adds legitimacy to EPLI by authorizing, requir-
ing, or encouraging public institutions to purchase such insurance and
use the risk-management services that insurers offer.
Thus, the content and meaning of law and regulatory policy in this
instance is determined by private organizations, such as insurance
148. In particular, “[r]isk-management and loss-prevention services allow insurers to not just
shift risk off employers, but also to provide an opportunity for insurers to encourage managerial-
ized responses and a formalization of policies and procedures in workplace settings.”  Talesh, A
New Institutional Theory, supra note 5, at 631. R
149. For a comprehensive analysis of the wide variety of public legal institutions including the
Department of Justice, state governments, and public schools that defer to and encourage orga-
nizations to purchase EPLI, see id. at 631–35.
In 1997, the U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for U.S. Trustees approved
EPLI insurance as an ‘actual, necessary expense’ of the trustee pursuant to her duties
as trustee.  This was based on the perceived increased number of lawsuits being filed
concerning employment practices and the need for trustees to avert and reduce risk to
themselves.
Id. at 631.
150. Id. at 632–33.
151. For a comprehensive analysis of the deference that schools give to EPLI, see id. at
633–34.
152. Id. at 633 n.83.  In particular, courts have (1) “broadened the duty to defend by allowing
for an unlimited right to insure under the duty to defend for intentional discrimination, even
where the duty to indemnify has been limited”; (2) “expanded defense coverage of potentially
nonindemnifiable acts, where it is unclear if such acts are nonindemnifiable at the pleading
stage,” (3) “held that there is indemnification coverage for disparate impact claims where any
discrimination was unintentional,” and (4) “redefined the intentional acts exclusion to require
not just an intentional act but also deliberate wrongdoing.” Id. at 633–34 n.83.
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companies.  The insurance field maintains a conception of employ-
ment law filtered through managerial and risk values, which highlights
the enhancement of employers’ formal structures that demonstrate
compliance and rational governance.  The insurance industry com-
municates and markets this vision by highlighting the risk of not de-
veloping policies and procedures, as well as by providing a protective
net for employers in the form of D&O insurance coverage.  The gov-
ernment adopts this conception into its policies by encouraging, au-
thorizing, and sometimes requiring governmental institutions to
purchase EPLI and the accompanying risk management services.
Thus, legal mandates requiring organizations to purchase EPLI look
like they emanate from public legal institutions, such as courts, legisla-
tures, and regulatory institutions, but in reality the mandates are gen-
erated from the insurance field’s responses to employment laws.153
The “ugliness” of insurance companies as regulators in the employ-
ment context lies in the manner in which insurers engage as regulatory
intermediaries.  In particular, EPL insurers translate and interpret the
meaning of compliance in ways that build discretion into legal rules
and recontextualize legal rules around a nonlegal risk logic that em-
phasizes averting risk and making discrimination claims more defensi-
ble.  Risk and managerial values work together in the context of
drafting, marketing, and selling EPLI.  To the extent EPLI and the
value-added services induce compliant behavior by private and public
institutions, requiring organizations to purchase EPLI may lead to
greater adherence to the civil rights goal of workplace equality.  How-
ever, my empirical data suggest that at times there is a considerable
disconnect between the moral values and rhetoric that legislators,
judges, and lawyers use to discuss anti-discrimination law and the risk
values and rhetoric that insurers use to suggest that litigation is inevi-
table and must be managed.  Thus, it is surprising that courts and leg-
islatures have deferred to, and at times encouraged, EPLI in some
cases.  The meaning of compliance with civil rights laws is at least par-
tially constructed by the insurance field.
IV. CONCLUSION
In a world where corporations face increasing pressure to be re-
sponsible to not just shareholders, but its employees, customers, and
the environment, corporations are turning to intermediaries, such as
insurance companies, to assist with complying with the vast array of
laws and regulations.  This Article brings the role of insurance and
153. See id. at 625–35.
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insurance institutions into a more direct conversation with concepts of
corporate social responsibility and organizational responses to legal
regulation.  While prior research explores the role that intermediaries
play in furthering corporate social responsibility and dealing with the
various laws that impact organizations, there has been little focus on
the role of insurance.  Conversely, while prior insurance law scholar-
ship celebrates the role of insurance companies as regulators, it largely
focuses on how policy provisions, actuarial practices, and contracting
allow insurers to act as risk regulators.  However, there has not been
as much empirical evaluation of how insurance companies tangibly act
as risk regulators.
This Article suggests that insurers as risk regulators is not as posi-
tive as previously articulated by scholars.  My conclusions are based
on studies that unpack how insurer risk management techniques regu-
late organizational behavior on the ground.  In the cyber security and
privacy law context, insurer risk management services and interven-
tions appear to be helping organizations avoid data breaches and vio-
lations with privacy laws.  Insurers have intervened in a market where
corporations admit to being under-prepared for data breach events,
being under-compliant with privacy laws, and feeling a sense of “com-
pliance fatigue.”154  Insurer risk management services are aimed at
preventing, detecting, and responding to data breach events in ways
that protect organizations and end-user consumers.  Insurers focus
less on communicating what the law means and more on how to stop
data breach events.  To that end, insurers are providing a high level of
technical expertise aimed at combating evolving attempts to hack or-
ganizations’ information.  Insurers are acting as compliance managers
and absorbing many of the functions that organizations feel they are
unable to deal with.  Insurers as risk managers appear to work well in
the cyber insurance context, in part, because organizations and con-
sumer interests are aligned in wanting to prevent any loss of personal
information.
Of course, in the context of directors and officers, insurers do very
little regulating even through insurers offer D&O insurance and have
the opportunity to engage in loss prevention or monitoring.  Insurers
in this context are to some extent ensuring corporate misconduct and
undermining the power of shareholder litigation because directors and
officers can pass the costs of these lawsuits off to insurers.  Thus, in-
surance in this context may increase moral hazard, or weaken the abil-
ity of law to nudge corporations toward more responsible behavior.
154. Armerding, supra note 50. R
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Insurers are unable and unwilling to act as risk regulators in the cor-
porate governance context.
In the EPLI context, the results are, at best, mixed, depending on
your perspective.  While data suggest EPLI and the risk management
services offered with the insurance policy can potentially improve em-
ployment practices and compliance, it also suggests that EPLI risk
management services often shape compliance in a way that leans more
toward making claims defensible rather than fostering a discrimina-
tion-free workplace.  Similar to D&O insurance, the punitive and de-
terrence goals of anti-discrimination laws may remain unfulfilled
when employers purchase EPLI and are able to pass those costs off to
insurers.  Moreover, too much reliance on EPLI risk management sys-
tems may allow employers to avoid more active involvement with the
design, content, enforcement, and maintenance of its employment pol-
icies.  By encouraging employers to use insurer-sponsored legal hot-
lines, insurer-sponsored contract builders, and employment handbook
online portals, the insurance field shifts responsibility for hard norma-
tive judgments to others (such as insurance companies) operating
outside the organization.
Finally, unlike the cyber and D&O contexts, EPLI risk management
services do not just reduce risk, they actively construct the meaning of
compliance and law.  Given that much of employment law is ambigu-
ous, insurance companies are filling in the space and interpreting the
meaning of compliance in ways that they do not in the privacy law
context.  The insurance field acts as a legal intermediary between the
language of civil rights caselaw and statutes and how civil rights are
implemented and enforced by employers.  Thus, similar to the D&O
context, risk management services may merely encourage employers
to reduce their exposure and liability rather than prevent discrimina-
tion, improve work culture, and cultivate a discrimination-free work
environment.
The empirical turn towards studying the processes and mechanisms
through which insurers act as risk regulators is important.  As opposed
to focusing on the forms and functions of insurance and analyzing the
conditions under which insurance companies impact society, more re-
cent empirical explorations of insurer risk management that are high-
lighted in this Article focus on the processes through which insurance
institutions construct the meaning of compliance and law.  In doing so,
I widen the lens on “insurance as regulation” beyond the deterrence,
moral hazard, and loss prevention focus of prior scholars.  The fact
that the insurance field transforms the moral logic of anti-discrimina-
tion law through a risk management filter demonstrates that the insur-
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ance-as-regulation narrative is not simply one of assessing how well
liability insurance delivers law’s deterrence signal.  Rather, insurance
as regulation is also a story of how insurance organizations transform
that deterrence signal.
The purpose of this Article is not to suggest that insurers are not
risk regulators.  Given the limitations of public regulatory law and pri-
vate contract law, clearly insurers are stepping in and regulating many
aspects of individual’s lives and how corporations operate.  Moreover,
this Article does not disagree with the notion suggested by insurance
law scholars that insurers can help regulate corporations, encourage
greater compliance, decrease moral hazard, and deter corporate mis-
conduct.  Insurers often engage in acts of regulation, in part, because
there is a regulatory void.  In the privacy, corporate, or employment
contexts, insurers have an opportunity to bring order to a field where
state regulators either have little access, mandate, or interest in regu-
lating.  Taken collectively, however, these three case studies suggest
that insurance companies as corporate regulators is a much more
cloudy proposition than previously thought.155  Too often scholars cel-
ebrate insurance regulatory interventions without unpacking precisely
how insurer risk management operates on the ground.  Moreover, in-
surance company impact on corporations goes beyond policy provi-
sion and language.  If these three case studies suggest anything, it is
that insurer risk management interventions are not always construc-
tive.  Thus, from a policy standpoint, public legal institutions, such as
courts, legislatures, and regulatory institutions, should not give so
much deference to insurance company regulatory interventions with-
out evaluating the precise way that insurer risk management tech-
niques operate.
Insurance as regulation, therefore, should be thought of on a con-
tinuum.  We must be mindful of the fact that each context is different.
For example, there are important distinctions between directors and
officers and cyber contexts.  In the directors and officers context, di-
rectors and officers are less eager to be told how to engage in risk
averse behavior.  Policyholders in the cyber context, however, are in-
155. To Ben-Shahar and Logue’s credit, they acknowledged that their argument on how insur-
ance reduces moral hazard needed further evaluation in part to determine if insurers play a
positive or negative role as insurers:
[r]egulation by insurance often walks a delicate path between a socially desirable, infor-
mation-rich incentive mechanism and an opportunistic set of self-serving, rent-seeking
tactics.  Insurers can require specific forms of conduct from their clients in order to
improve safety, but they can also do this as a pretense for unjustified denial of paid-for-
coverage.  We don’t know which pattern dominates.
Ben-Shahar & Logue, Outsourcing Regulation, supra note 7, at 248. R
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terested in the insurance defense and indemnity coverage but also the
accompanying risk management services that can prevent, detect, and
respond to a data breach event.  The risk management services that
accompany cyber insurance also fill a competency or knowledge gap
for the organization.  Organizations are willing to use risk manage-
ment tools that deal with the latest cyber threats that it lacks internal
tools to defend against.  In contrast, directors and officers believe they
possess the requisite knowledge and experience to manage a corpora-
tion responsibly and are less eager to receive insurance risk manage-
ment recommendations.
There are also differences between the EPLI and cyber situations.
EPLI insurers spend considerable time trying to shape the meaning of
law for employers tasked with dealing with discrimination laws
whereas cyber insurers spend far less time mediating law’s meaning
and far more time trying to enhance an organization’s ability to detect
and respond when faced with a data breach.  Unlike in the EPLI con-
text, the cyber insurance risk management tools are less about simply
avoiding being sued and more about developing processes to prevent
or limit any data breach problem from occurring.  Therefore, the con-
ditions under which insurance as regulation works depends on a vari-
ety of factors.
Moving forward, we need more empirical studies that reveal how
insurer risk management services and loss prevention practices actu-
ally operate.  This is crucial because insurer rules and interventions
are not established after public debate, periods of comment and revi-
sion, or votes by an electoral body.  Insurance company risk manage-
ment is often concealed by layers of organizational routines and not
always recognized as insurance rules.  Insurance scholars and regula-
tors need to explore under what conditions insurers act as regulatory
intermediaries in ways that decrease the likelihood of moral hazard.
How insurance company based deterrence plays out on the ground is
much more complicated than previously suggested.  Corporations are
increasingly nudged toward more stakeholder models of governance
that encourage broader levels of accountability to communities be-
yond just shareholders.  Corporations increasingly rely on in-
termediaries due to the rise of laws impacting corporations.  Through
various lines of insurance, insurers play a significant role in steering
organizations toward complying, or at least appearing to comply, with
the many laws that regulate organizations.  Given that there is varia-
tion in the extent to which insurer risk management and compliance
programs embrace or neglect formal adherence to privacy, corporate,
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and employment laws, future studies should examine under what con-
ditions insurers, in their capacity as risk managers, facilitate or inhibit
corporate social responsibility and the goals of legal regulation.
